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Introduction
The intention of this paper is to place 
the current security issues in the 
Middle East in a global context and 
to do so in terms of the next three 
decades. Over that time span there 
are likely to be four main determi-
nants of global peace and confl ict.
Socio-economic Divisions
The globalised and largely unre-
stricted free market economy 
of recent decades has resulted 
in impressive economic growth 
across much of the world, not just 
in the countries of the Atlantic 
community but most notably in 
South and East Asia, where growth 
rates in some countries have been 
exceeding 7% per annum.
At the same time, the current 
world economic system has been 
singularly unsuccessful in enabling 
a fair distribution of the fruits of that 
growth. Instead, a remarkable divi-
sion has evolved between around one 
fi fth of the world’s population that 
has done impressively well over the 
past forty years and the majority that 
has been largely excluded from the 
effects of economic success. The very 
large ‘elite’ is not concentrated in any 
one country, even if the majority is in 
the Atlantic countries and East Asia. 
Of the 1.1 billion people among the 
elite perhaps a third are in China, 
India and countries such as Brazil, 
but the majorities in such countries 
are increasingly marginalised. 
The extent of the division is 
remarkable, quite apart from the 
‘super-elite’ (for the fi rst time, the 
2007 Fortune 500 list of the rich-
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est Americans were all dollar 
billionaires) – according to the UN’s 
WIDER Institute in Helsinki, the 
richest 10% of the world’s popula-
tion has amassed 85% of household 
wealth and the poorest 50% have 
just 1%. This socio-economic divide 
has evolved over several dec-
ades and there are no indications 
of a narrowing of the gap.
Education and 
Communications 
At the same time, perhaps the most 
impressive progress in human 
development of the past forty years 
has been the improvement in educa-
tion across the majority world. A far 
higher proportion of the marginal-
ised majority of the world’s people 
now receives at least four years of 
primary education, literacy rates 
are far higher and the improve-
ments in education and literacy 
are at last being enjoyed by girls as 
well as boys. There have also been 
major changes in communications, 
not least with radio and televi-
sion. The ‘data poor’ aspect of the 
digital revolution may still be with 
us, but even that is being redressed 
by the wider use of the web.
All of these changes are to be 
welcomed as some of the most sig-
nificant aspects of human progress, 
but they also involve a marked 
increase in the awareness of mar-
ginalisation by the majority of the 
world’s people. During the 1970s, 
western economic growth was said to 
embody a ‘revolution of rising expec-
tations’ as people looked towards 
the consumer benefits of expanding 
economies. Now, the more likely 
result of the failure of the global 
economy to ensure socio-economic 
justice is a potential ‘revolution 
of frustrated expectations’. 
In China, for example, the impres-
sive but hugely unbalanced economic 
growth of the coastal cities has been 
accompanied by many thousands of 
examples of social unrest including 
riots and other violent demonstra-
tions, especially in the towns and 
cities of provincial and rural China 
were the majority of the population 
still live. India has seen remarkable 
economic growth in recent years but it 
has also seen, against all expectations, 
the renaissance of the Naxalite neo-
Maoist movement, which now affects 
more than one third of all of the states 
of the country. Much of the support 
for the al-Qaida movement comes 
from marginalised young men across 
the Middle East, South West Asia and 
overseas diasporas who may be quite 
well educated and not in dire poverty 
yet who see themselves as thoroughly 
and persistently marginalised.
Environmental Constraints
There are no signs that the trends 
towards socio-economic divisions are 
easing, and these divisions are likely 
to be exacerbated by the impact of 
environmental constraints. One form 
of constraint is the location of some 
of the world’s key resources, notably 
oil and natural gas, in very restricted 
parts of the world, the most notable 
example being the concentration of 
close to two-thirds of the world’s 
oil reserves in the countries around 
the Persian Gulf, but other global 
issues have come to be recognised 
as having even greater importance. 
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In the late twentieth century, the 
world-wide human community 
began to have an impact on the entire 
global ecosystem – the biosphere – 
for the first time in history. Before 
then there had been major local 
and regional effects stemming from 
such phenomena as atmospheric 
and water pollution, land derelic-
tion or depletion of marine fisheries, 
but none had had a global impact.
The first example of such an 
impact came in the early 1980s with 
the recognition that a small group of 
chemicals, the chlorofluorocarbons 
(CFCs), were degrading the ozone 
layer in the upper atmosphere that 
protects living organisms on the 
earth’s surface by filtering out exces-
sive ultra-violet radiation from the 
sun. The potential destruction of 
the ozone layer was recognised as 
a matter of great urgency and in a 
remarkable example of international 
cooperation the 1987 Montreal Con-
vention was agreed that resulted in 
the phasing out of the use of CFCs. 
The complete removal of CFCs 
will take many years and their 
impact on the ozone layer is persist-
ent over decades, but it is unlikely 
that the destruction of the ozone 
layer will get any worse and the 
layer will ultimately recover. This 
is something of a success story but 
was made easy by the limited range 
of chemicals that were responsible 
and, in particular, by the ease with 
which they could be replaced.
This does not apply to the much 
greater example of a global human 
impact, progressive climate change 
due primarily to the emission of 
carbon dioxide from the burning of 
fossil fuels. There is now a broad 
international consensus that climate 
change is by far the most important 
environmental problem for the 21st 
century and that urgent action is 
required to prevent catastrophic 
change. This is made more urgent, 
and links in with socio-economic 
divisions, by a recognition that it 
is likely to have a profound effect 
on those parts of the world which 
have the greatest incidence of 
poverty and disempowerment.
Until about 15 years ago, most cli-
mate change research tended to show 
that the temperate regions would be 
those parts of the world most affected 
by climate change. Britain, for exam-
ple, would get warmer and windier, 
with northern and western parts 
getting wetter and the south and east 
getting drier. If the main impact of 
climate change was in the northern 
and southern temperate latitudes, 
then at least it would affect countries 
that had the economic resources to 
adapt. There was a belief that the 
tropical and sub-tropical regions 
would be ‘buffered’ by natural 
processes from the impact of human-
‘There is now a broad 
international consensus that 
climate change is by far the 
most important environmental 
problem for the 21st century’
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induced climate change, just as they 
had been buffered and therefore 
largely unaffected by prehistoric 
examples of natural climate change.
By the mid-1990s, this relatively 
hopeful prognosis had largely 
changed and it became recognised 
that those regions would be greatly 
affected in three ways. One would 
be rising sea levels affecting many of 
the large coastal cities of the south 
and also the low-lying but very fertile 
river deltas such as the Ganges/
Brahmaputra. A second would be 
a pronounced increase in the inten-
sity of tropical storms, especially 
typhoons hitting densely-populated 
land masses and causing numerous 
casualties and catastrophic damage.
The third and most damaging 
aspect of climate change would be 
major changes in the distribution 
of rainfall, with many areas sub-
ject to long-term drought. Given 
that the tropical and sub-tropical 
land masses are home to most of 
the world’s people and provide 
the agricultural systems that feed 
them, there is the potential for 
huge problems of food scarcity.
All of these issues of tropical and 
sub-tropical climate change will 
affect societies least able to cope with 
the consequences and will interact 
with the enduring problem of socio-
economic marginalisation. Unless 
these trends are altered, especially the 
‘drying-out’ of tropical and sub-trop-
ical land masses, it would be wise to 
expect an era of intense migratory 
pressures at a level far higher than 
those currently due to economic dif-
ference, coupled with a more intense 
evolution of radical and extreme 
social movements as a minority of 
people on the educated margins 
respond to their predicament.
The Security Paradigm
 The final issue is that the current 
western security paradigm is essen-
tially short-term and concentrates 
primarily on maintaining the security 
of the countries of the North Atlantic 
and their international interests. It 
is state- and alliance-centred and 
does not extend to addressing the 
underlying issues of marginalisa-
tion and environmental constraints. 
It has been appropriately termed 
‘liddism’ – keeping the lid on security 
problems and seeking to maintain 
control within a status quo, rather 
than addressing the problems at 
root. While the recent proposals 
on responding to climate change 
are welcome, they are not remotely 
sufficient to reverse current trends. 
There has been some progress on the 
issue of debt relief but virtually none 
on trade reform or on development 
strategies designed to foster sustain-
able and gendered development. 
The Middle East Context
All of the major issues so far dis-
cussed have a particular resonance 
for the Middle East. The wealth/pov-
erty divide is particularly marked in 
the countries with large populations 
– from Morocco through to Egypt 
and Iran and extending beyond to 
south-west Asia, especially Paki-
stan - and there is marked exclusion 
even in essentially wealthy states 
such as Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, 
the relatively high birth rates in a 
number of countries means that there 
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is currently a large cohort of young 
people coming out of education with 
little prospect of gainful employment. 
At the same time, the region has 
witnessed an impressive growth 
in communications, especially in 
24-hour satellite news channels such 
as Al-Arabiya and Al-Jazeera, with 
these giving a robust and more inde-
pendent coverage of domestic and 
international issues. It has also seen 
a substantial increase in other forms 
of communication including the web, 
broadband and mobile phones, mak-
ing it substantially easier for radical 
movements to spread their messages.
On the issue of climate change, 
the prognosis for the region is 
particularly negative, with pre-
dictions of substantial decreases 
in rainfall in an environment in 
which there are already intense 
pressures on water resources.
There is, furthermore, a specific 
issue of resource constraint stem-
ming from international trends in 
oil resource location and use. The 
countries around the Persian Gulf, 
especially Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia and the United Arab Emir-
ates, collectively have over 60% of 
all the world’s remaining proved 
reserves of high quality oil, with 
much of the rest in Russia, Kaza-
khstan and Venezuela. At the same 
time, Western Europe, Japan and 
India are all heavily dependent on 
imported oil. Even more significant 
has been the increasing oil import 
dependency of the United States and 
China. The US now imports about 
60% of all the oil it needs, with this 
set to rise still further as its domestic 
reserves are depleted (US reserves 
are currently about a quarter of those 
of Iraq). China was self-sufficient in 
oil until 1993 but will need to import 
half of all its massively increasing 
requirements within two years.
The maintenance of its interests 
in the Persian Gulf region has been 
a singular feature of US security 
policy for well over fifty years, and 
has been marked by such develop-
ments as the creation of the Joint 
Rapid Deployment Task Force in the 
later 1970s, its enhancement into US 
Central Command in the mid-1980s, 
the vigorous campaign to evict a 
previous ally, Iraq, from Kuwait in 
1991, a sustained programme of arms 
sales and military cooperation in the 
region and the recent re-designation 
of the US Fifth Fleet as the guardian 
of the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea.
In its conduct of the ‘war on ter-
ror’, the United States has pursued 
radical Islamist groups with remark-
able vigour but to little effect. The 
al-Qaida movement is much more 
active in the 2000s than it was in the 
1990s prior to 9/11, there are endur-
ing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
and there has been a substantial 
‘In its conduct of the “war 
on terror”, the United States 
has pursued radical Islamist 
groups with remarkable  
vigour but to little effect’
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increase in anti-Americanism across 
much of society in the region, at least 
outside the narrow confines of rul-
ing elites. The al-Qaida movement 
envisages its short-term aims against 
its near and far enemies (regional 
elites and the western alliance 
respectively) in terms of decades, 
and its long term aim of establishing 
a new Caliphate over an even longer 
time scale. The United States and 
its western allies regard the security 
of the Persian Gulf oil reserves as 
essential to their economic well-being 
over several decades. The region 
therefore faces the prospect of a long 
period of instability and conflict, but 
this is likely to be exacerbated by 
the socio-economic divide and the 
consequences of climate change.
Conclusion
On present trends the Middle East 
region might best be regarded as that 
part of the world that is most likely 
to experience the adverse conse-
quences of current failures to face up 
to the core world trends discussed 
earlier. It may also be the region 
most likely to benefit from any major 
re-thinking of the western security 
paradigm that might be rooted in 
sustainable security, embedding the 
concepts of human and common 
security in a paradigm that looks 
to long-term conflict prevention.
Given the failure of the current 
‘control’ paradigm as applied to 
the region – two wars, 150,000+ 
civilian deaths, well over 120,000 
people detained without trial, and 
deep-rooted antagonism to foreign 
occupation – there is an urgency for 
re-thinking security that transcends 
that in any other part of the world. 
If such a paradigm shift could be 
achieved it would be of great benefit 
to the region. If applied world-wide 
it might do much to ensure a more 
stable and peaceful international 
system in the coming decades.
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